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TOWARDS A CYBERSECURITY POLICY MODEL: 
ISRAEL NATIONAL CYBER BUREAU CASE STUDY  
 
Daniel Benoliel* 
 
Designing and implementing a cybersecurity legal policy is an 
ambitious endeavor. This Article offers primary guidelines focusing 
on the national level, and uses Israel’s newly created National 
Cyber Bureau as a case in point. Additionally, this Article offers a 
cross-section comparison between the national cybersecurity 
policies of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, 
and the Netherlands.  
It further introduces additional considerations including the 
balancing of cybersecurity with civil liberties, cybercrime policy, 
adherence to international law and international humanitarian law, 
forms of regulation (technological standards, legislation, courts, 
markets, and norms), and prevalent forms of cooperation 
(intra-governmental, regional, public-private platform, and 
inter-governmental). 
Ultimately, this Article could facilitate academic-government 
cooperation in the design of an archetypical cybersecurity policy 
model for countries henceforth. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Recent revelations about the United States National Security 
Agency’s (“NSA”) clandestine electronic surveillance projects raised 
a public debate worldwide concerning the legality of government 
non-compliance with democratic principles.1 From a national 
perspective, developing a comprehensive cybersecurity policy is 
challenging for two reasons. First, cybersecurity is largely shrouded 
with secrecy and over-classification. Second, the traditional major 
stakeholders in the field are national defense and intelligence 
agencies.  
This excessive secrecy within the newly established Israeli 
National Cyber Bureau and elsewhere is already burdensome in 
current policy initiatives.2 Not surprisingly, the original attempts to 
regulate cybersecurity for the private sector started with, and are 
still predominantly restricted to, technological standard setting and 
governmental-industry cooperation. To date, four such private 
sector endeavors are prevalent. These include the highly popular 
International Organization for Standardization’s (“ISO”) ISO 
27001,3 and ISO 270024—two cybersecurity standards offering 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A key example is the PRISM project. PRISM gathers Internet communications 
derived from demands made to Internet companies such as Yahoo! Inc. It does 
so under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 in order to yield any 
data that counters court-approved search terms. See Barton Gellman & Ashkan 
Soltani, NSA infiltrates links to Yahoo, Google data centers worldwide, Snowden 
documents say, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-
snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_ 
story.html. 
2 LIOR TABANSKY, CYBERDEFENSE POLICY OF ISRAEL: EVOLVING THREATS 
AND RESPONSES 2 (2013), available at http://sectech.tau.ac.il/sites/default/files/ 
publications/article_3_12_-_chaire_cyberdefense.pdf. Mr. Tal Goldstein, from 
the Israeli National Cyber Bureau, emphasized that, to a large extent, 
commercial enterprises themselves withhold their cooperation with INCB cyber 
defense organizations due to commercially-related secrecy concerns. Interview 
with Tal Goldenstein, Israeli National Cyber Bureau (Sept. 21, 2014).  
3 INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, An Introduction to ISO 27001 (ISO27001), 
available at http://www.27000.org/iso-27001.htm (labelled as “specification for 
an information security management system (ISMS)”). 
4 INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, Introduction to ISO 27002 (ISO27002), 
available at http://www.27000.org/iso-27002.htm (offering “guidelines and 
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International Organization for Standardization and the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (“IEC”) (jointly labeled “ISO/IEC”) 
voluntary certifications for complying businesses. In addition, 
there are the Information Security Forum’s (“ISF”) Standard of 
Good Practice for Information Security (“SoGP”), which covers 
a spectrum of information security arrangements to keep business 
risks associated with information systems,5 the Software Assurance 
Maturity Model (“SAMM”) best practices in software security,6 
and, lastly, the Cloud Security Alliance’s (“CSA”) best practices 
for cloud computing.7 In the backdrop of this technical orientation 
towards cyber security, the focus has gradually been shifting onto 
other stakeholders interested in Internet governance-related policy. 
Such stakeholders typically preside within academia, international 
non-governmental initiatives, and governments regulating 
cybersecurity.8 
To begin with, numerous governments have already taken on 
this initiative while offering the most advanced sets of cybersecurity 
policies. These are most noticeably the United States,9 the United 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
general principles for initiating, implementing, maintaining, and improving 
information security management within an organization.”). 
5 See Info Sec. Forum's (ISF), THE STANDARD OF GOOD PRACTICE FOR 
INFORMATION SECURITY (SOGP), available at https://www.securityforum.org/ 
tools/sogp/. 
6 The Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM) is an open framework to 
help organizations formulate and implement a strategy for software security. See 
Common Assurance Maturity Model (CAMM), Software Assurance Maturity 
Model: A guide to building security into software development Version—1.0, 3, 
http://www.opensamm.org/downloads/SAMM-1.0.pdf. The building blocks of 
the model are the three maturity levels defined for each of the twelve security 
practices. Id. These define a wide variety of activities in which an organization 
could engage to reduce security risks and increase software assurance. Id. 
7 See Cloud Security Alliance (CSA), Security Guidance for Critical Areas of 
Focus in Cloud Computing 35–37 (3rd ed. 2011), https://downloads. 
cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/guidance/csaguide.v3.0.pdf. CSA's best practices 
cover potential legal issues when using cloud computing. These include 
protection requirements for information and computer systems, security breach 
disclosure laws, regulatory requirements, privacy requirements, international 
laws, etc. Id.  
8 See infra notes 9–23 and accompanying text. 
9 See generally, Barack Obama. Exec. Order—Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity (February 12, 2013); The White House, Presidential Policy 
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Kingdom,10 Canada,11 Japan,12 Germany,13 the Netherlands,14 and 
most recently, Israel, with its establishment of an Israel National 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Directive—Critical Infrastructure and Resilience (February 12, 2013) 
(PDD-21); H.R. REP. NO. 3696, 113th Cong. 1st Session, National 
Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2013; U.S Dept. of 
Homeland Sec., NIPP 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience; THE WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: 
PROSPERITY, SECURITY, AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD (May 2011), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_ 
strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR 
CYBERSPACE]; National Infrastructure Advisory Council, Critical Infrastructure 
Partnership Strategic Assessment: Final Report and Recommendations (October 
14, 2008); The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: 
Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection (December 
17, 2003) (HSPD-7); The White House, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-
63, (May 22, 1998); The White House, Presidential Decision Directive 63: 
Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection (Washington, DC: U.S, Government 
Printing Office, 1998); The President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (PCCIP), Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructures, 
Washington (October 1997). PCCIP does not exist today. Its functions have 
been reallocated per HSPD-7.     
10 See UK CABINET OFFICE, CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED 
KINGDOM: SAFETY, SECURITY AND RESILIENCE IN CYBER SPACE (London: The 
Cabinet Office, CM 7642, June 2009), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228841/7642.pdf (discussing Great Britain’s 
2009 policy initiative).   
11 See Government of Canada, Canada’s Cyber Security Strategy for a Stronger 
and More Prosperous Canada (2010), available at http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/ 
cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/cbr-scrt-strtgy/cbr-scrt-strtgy-eng.pdf [hereinafter Canada’s Cyber 
Security Strategy].  
12 See Information Security Strategy for Protecting the Nation (June 10, 2013), 
available at http://www.nisc.go.jp/active/kihon/pdf/cybersecuritystrategy-en.pdf. 
Earlier the Japanese Information Security Policy Council released the 
Information Security Strategy for Protecting the Nation. See Information 
Security Strategy for Protecting the Nation (May 11, 2010), available at 
http://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/New_Strategy_English.pdf. 
13 See Federal Ministry of the Interior, Cyber Security Strategy for Germany 
(February 2011), available at https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/ 
BSI/Publications/CyberSecurity/Cyber_Security_Strategy_for_Germany.pdf?__
blob=publicationFile. 
14 See NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY, STRATEGY 2: FROM AWARENESS TO 
CAPABILITY (2013) [hereinafter NCSS 2]; see also The Netherlands Ministry of 
Science and Justice, THE NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY (NCSS) 
(2011) [hereinafter NCSS].  
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Cyber Bureau (“INCB”) in 2011. These national initiatives have 
also served to characterize cybersecurity threats as predominantly 
national instead of merely global or international.15 This Article 
focuses on the national level within this natural regulatory flow.  
Other stakeholders have also begun initiating equivalent 
policies. For example, the NETMundial platform offers a fresh, 
bottom-up, NGO-based alternative.16 This platform directly states 
as one of its seven principles for internet governance: “Security, 
stability[,] and resilience of the internet should be a key objective” 
and prioritizes “[e]ffectiveness in addressing risks and threats to 
security and stability of the Internet depends on strong cooperation 
among different stakeholders.”17 Similarly, the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (“OSCE”) has been discussing 
cybersecurity issues for many years, offering yet another 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Brigid Grauman, CYBER-SECURITY: THE VEXED QUESTION OF GLOBAL 
RULES: AN INDEPENDENT REPORT ON CYBER-PREPAREDNESS AROUND THE 
WORLD, 66–67 edited by Security & Defence Agenda (SDA) & McAfee Inc. 
Brussels: Security & Defence Agenda (SDA), 2012 [hereinafter the Security & 
Defence Agenda (SDA)]. 
16 The NetMundial platform is a voluntary bottom-up, open, and participatory 
process involving thousands of people from governments, private sector, civil 
society, technical community, and academia worldwide on Internet governance 
ecosystem. See NETMUNDIAL: GLOBAL MULTISTAKEHOLDER MEETING ON THE 
FUTURE OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE, http://netmundial.br/ (last visited Jan. 19, 
2015); see also GIP Exclusive Coverage of NETmundial, GENEVA INTERNATIONAL 
PLATFORM, http://giplatform.org/events/netmundial (last visited Jan. 19, 2015). 
17 NETMUNDIAL, NETMUNDIAL MULTISTAKEHOLDER STATEMENT 5 (2014), 
available at http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-
Multistakeholder-Document.pdf (defined as one of NETmundial's seven principles, 
titled: “Security and stability and resilience of the internet”). The statement is a 
result of NETmundial's first conference held in Sao Paulo, Brazil between April 
22–24, 2014. NETmundial, ROADMAP FOR THE FURTHER EVOLUTION OF THE 
INTERNET GOVERNANCE ECOSYSTEM (2014), available at http://content. 
netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-the-further-evolution-of-the-internet-
governance-ecosystem/177 (reiterating international cooperation “on topics such 
as jurisdiction and law enforcement assistance to promote cyber security and 
prevent cybercrime”). NETmundial's “Roadmap for the Further Evolution of the 
internet governance ecosystem” Part (2)III(1)(a) (titled: “Security and stability”) 
in part (2) dealing with specific internet governance topics—further reiterates 
international cooperation “on topics such as jurisdiction and law enforcement 
assistance to promote cybersecurity and prevent cybercrime.” Id. 
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multinational discussion platform. To illustrate, at the 2010 OSCE 
Summit, the Heads of State and Government of the fifty-six 
participating states of the OSCE emphasized that “greater unity of 
purpose and action in facing emerging transnational threats” must 
be achieved, while offering an international “security community.”18 
Significantly, the Astana Commemorative Declaration mentions 
cyber threats as one of these emerging transnational threats 
bridging the north-south divide between developed and developing 
countries.19 Yet in comparison to the NETMundial policy platform, 
OSCE’s Summit has not yielded more concrete cybersecurity 
recommendations to date. 
Lastly, a landmark decision took place at the United Nations 
(“UN”) in 2013. For the first time, a group of governmental 
experts from fifteen member states agreed to acknowledge the full 
applicability of international law and state responsibility to state 
behavior in cyberspace.20 They did this by extending traditional 
transparency and confidence-building measures and by recommending 
international cooperation, making information and communications 
technology (“ICT”) infrastructure more secure against cyber threats 
worldwide.21 However, the decision has not yet become customary 
international law and is still nonbinding within public international 
law.  
Information security has been on the UN’s agenda since the 
Russian Federation first introduced a draft resolution in the First 
Committee of the UN General Assembly in 1998.22 Since then, 
there have been annual reports by the Secretary-General to the 
General Assembly incorporating the views of UN member states. 
There have also been three Groups of Governmental Experts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE,THE ASTANA 
COMMEMORATIVE DECLARATION: TOWARDS A SECURITY COMMUNITY arts. 9, 
11 (2010), available at http://www.osce.org/cio/74985?download=true. 
19 See id. art 9. 
20 See U.N.G.A., GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS ON DEVELOPMENTS IN 
THE FIELD OF INFORMATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 5 (2013). 
21 Id. at 2. 
22 The General Assembly Resolution was adopted without a vote as G.A. Res. 
53/70, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/70 (Jan. 4, 1999). 
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(“GGE”) that have reviewed present and future cyber threats and 
cooperative measures.23  
In the backdrop of these surfacing initiatives, this Article offers 
a comparative review of the Israeli National Cyber Bureau, which 
was established in 2011. The Article seeks to assist in constructing 
a comprehensive model national cybersecurity policy partially 
based on Israel's example, as well as those of the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and the Netherlands.  
A question remains: why Israel? Two significant reasons come 
to mind. First, Israel’s cyber defense apparatus is world-renowned 
and is considered one of the best. An international comparative 
study of twenty-three developed countries by a Brussels’ security 
and defense think-tank within a Security & Defense Agenda's 
(“SDA”) cybersecurity initiative recently awarded Israel with a top 
grade on “cyberdefense,” alongside Sweden and Finland.24 This 
rating is particularly impressive in light of the number of cyber 
attacks Israel faces—unlike the two relatively untested Scandinavian 
countries, Israel sees approximately 1000 cyber attacks within a 
hierarchy of threats every minute.25 Second, Israel exports more 
cyber-related products and services than all other nations 
combined, excluding the United States.26 Both Israel’s technological 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The first successful GGE report was issued in 2010. Rep. of the Group of 
Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, 2009–2010, U.N. 
Doc. A/65/201 (2010). In 2011, the General Assembly unanimously approved a 
resolution calling for a follow-up to the last GGE. G.A. Res. 66/24, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/66/24 (Dec. 22, 2011); see U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs, Fact 
Sheet: Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the 
Context of International Security 2 (June 2013), available at http://www.un.org/ 
disarmament/HomePage/factsheet/iob/Information_Security_Fact_Sheet.pdf. 
24 See The Security & Defense Agenda (SDA), supra note 15, at 66–67.  
25 Id. at 66. In fact, different to the experience of most countries with advanced 
cybersecurity policies, Israel's policy did not evolve in response to civil threats, 
i.e., cyber crime, but instead it reacted mostly to national security considerations 
due to the country's notable geo-political security challenges. See Interview with 
Tal Goldstein, Israeli National Cyber Bureau, supra note 2.  
26 See Barbara Opall-Rome, Israel Claims $3B in Cyber Exports; 2nd Only to 
US, DEFENSENEWS, (Jun. 20, 2014, 3:19 PM), http://www.defensenews.com/ 
article/20140620/DEFREG04/306200018/Israel-Claims-3B-Cyber-Exports-2nd-
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prominence and its being funneled by global market dominance 
have turned it into a global leader in the field and a precious, 
evolving, working example.  
Part II introduces the Israeli National Cyber Bureau initiative 
and the Israeli government’s underlying recommendations. Part III 
then maps main cybersecurity themes through the lens of the 
Israeli initiative. It opens with cybersecurity definitions including 
the range of cyber threats, types of cybersecurity risks, and types 
of practices not designated as cybersecurity risks.  
Part III reviews models of cooperation over cybersecurity, 
including inter-governmental, public-private platform (“PPP”), and 
regional cooperation. Part III then considers specific 
cybersecurity-related legal topics including cybersecurity aspects 
in international law, cyber attacks and international humanitarian 
law, and cyber treaties and international treaty law. Part III further 
covers national and state responsibility for cyber attacks, 
cybercrimes and cyber security, international human rights law, 
and privacy law. Part IV then offers a cross-section policy 
comparison between five leading national cybersecurity policies of 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and the 
Netherlands. Lastly, Part V concludes with primary recommendations 
aimed at facilitating academia-government cooperation in designing 
a cybersecurity policy model for countries worldwide. 
II. MISSION AND FUNCTION OF THE INCB 
Israeli cybersecurity policy was established based on two major 
official milestones. The first was the 2010 National Cyber 
Initiative, which aimed for Israel to become a top five global cyber 
superpower by 2015.27 The second milestone, coming after years of 
acknowledged departmentalized activities in various branches, was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Only-US (stating that last year Israel sales reached $3 billion which make 
approximately 5 percent of the global market). 
27 See National Cyber Initiative—Special Report for the Prime Minister (The 
State of Israel, Ministry of Science and Technology, the National Council on 
Research and Development and the Supreme Council on Science and 
Technology, eds.) 2011 (Hebrew), translation provided by Daniel Benoliel. 
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Resolution No. 3611,28 which adopted recommendations for the 
National Cyber Initiative.29 At the core of these two initiatives 
stood the establishment of the INCB in the Prime Minister’s office. 
The INCB reports directly to the Prime Minister.30 The INCB’s 
mission has been to serve as an advisory body for the Prime 
Minister, the government, and its committees presiding over national 
policy in the cyber field, and to promote its implementation.31  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Advancing National Cyberspace Capabilities, Isr. Res. 3611 (2011), available 
at http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/PrimeMinistersOffice/DivisionsAndAuthorities/ 
cyber/Documents/Advancing%20National%20Cyberspace%20Capabilities.pdf 
(unofficial, English version) [hereinafter Resolution No. 3611].  
29 Against this backdrop, the Israeli government sought to establish a national 
cyber policy as early as 2002. In the same year, Israel drew a list of nineteen 
major infrastructures incorporating power production, water supply or banking, 
held as either public or private with the purpose of standardizing core, albeit 
effectively limited legal and technological protection thereof. Security & 
Defence Agenda, supra note 15, at 67. Until the establishment of the Israeli 
National Cyber Bureau in 2011, Israel based its rather fragmented policies on 
Special Resolution B/84 on The responsibility for protecting computerized 
systems in the State of Israel by the ministerial committee on national security of 
December 11, 2002, launched the national civilian cyberdefense policy. In 
balance, it has been the latter Special Resolution that catalyzed the establishment 
of the Israeli Cyber Bureau. See Tabansky, supra note 2, at 2. Israel undertook 
numerous other steps to address cyber threats. In 2002, a government decision 
established the State Israel Security Agency (Shabak unit) (“ISA”). The ISA is 
accountable for the specialized guidance of the bodies under its responsibility in 
terms of essential computer infrastructure security against threats of terrorism 
and sabotage. To illustrate, when the instigation of the biometric database in 
Israel led to an enormous public dispute, a recent law was enacted in 2009 and 
consequently the State Authority for Information Security received a defensive 
role in prevention of cyber attacks on the biometric database. See, ISA 
website—ISA Statute Chronology, at http://www.shabak.gov.il/english/about/ 
pages/theisastatute.aspx.  
30 See id.; see also Advancing National Cyberspace Capabilities, supra note 28; 
National Cyber Bureau, PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, http://www.pmo.gov.il/ 
ENGLISH/PRIMEMINISTERSOFFICE/DIVISIONSANDAUTHORITIES/CY
BER/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 18, 2015). 
31 National Cyber Bureau, supra note 30 (“The Bureau functions as an 
advising body for the Prime Minister, the government and its committees, which 
recommends national policy in the cyber field and promotes its implementation, 
in accordance with the law and government resolutions.”). 
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The INCB’s mandate is threefold. First: defend national 
infrastructures from cyber attack.32 This aspect has not been 
restricted to a traditional reactive strategy as it also considers a 
preventative approach.33 Second: advance Israel as a world-leading 
center of information technology based on the country’s technological 
advancement.34 Third: encourage cooperation between academia, 
industry, and the private sector, as well as between government 
agencies and the security community.35 
These broad policies were further detailed within Resolution 
No. 3611. The Resolution’s first mentioned purpose and its raison 
d'être is officially establishing the INCB in the Prime Minister’s 
Office.36 The Resolution further calls for regulating responsibility 
for dealing with the cyber field albeit broadly.37 Addendum B to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See id.; see also Resolution No. 3611, supra note 28, at 1 (“To improve the 
defense of national infrastructures which are essential for maintaining a stable 
and productive life in the State of Israel and to strengthen those infrastructures, 
as much as possible, against cyber attack[.]”). 
33 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON 
DETERRING CYBERATTACKS: INFORMING STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPING 
OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2010) 
(overviewing the immense challenges facing a traditional law enforcement 
reactive cybersecurity deterrence); MARTIN C. LIBICKI, CYBERDETERRENCE AND 
CYBERWAR (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009). But see, Derek E. Bambauer, 
Privacy Versus Security, 103(3) J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 667  (2013) 
(arguing that cybersecurity policy must focus on mitigating breaches rather than 
preventing them). 
34 Resolution No. 3611, supra note 28 at 1 (“[A]dvancing Israel’s status as a 
center for the development of information technologies[.]”). Thus, two years 
after the establishment of the Israeli National Cyber Bureau, the Prime Minister, 
the Mayor of the southern metropolitan of city Beer-Sheva and the President of 
Ben Gurion University announced the establishment of a national cyber complex 
in Beer-Sheva, to be named CyberSpark, where INCB's command center also 
presides. See Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu Announces Creation of 
CyberSpark in Beer-Sheva, BEN-GURION UNIV. OF THE NEGEV (Jan. 27, 2014), 
http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/Pages/news/CyberSpark.aspx. Two giant international companies, 
Lockheed Martin and IBM, have announced they will join Deutsche Telekom 
and EMC in setting up their research activities in the park. Id. 
35 Resolution No. 3611, supra note 28, at 1 (“[E]ncouraging cooperation 
among academia, industry and the private sector, government ministries and 
special bodies.”).  
36 Id. at 2. 
37 Id. 
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the Resolution offers a model description of responsibilities, 
incorporating a Head Bureau position,38 steering committee,39 and 
related administrative working procedures.40 The third decision set 
by the Resolution has been to advance defensive cyber capabilities 
in Israel and advance research and development in cyberspace and 
supercomputing.41 Numerous concrete policies are then detailed by 
the Resolution, which could be categorized as educational, policy 
compliance-related, or strategic recommendations. 
First, the INCB’s educational-related recommendations proactively 
to identify and mitigate specific cybersecurity threats. The INCB is 
consequently said to devise “national education plans,”42 generally 
aimed at “increasing public awareness” of cyber threats.43 Similar to 
cybersecurity organizations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(“NATO”),44 the United States Pentagon’s cyber-command 
(“USCYBERCOM”),45 Germany,46 United Kingdom,47 and Finland,48 
the Israeli Cyber Bureau is said to respectively coordinate national 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Id. at 8 (referring to Addendum B entitled: “Regulating Responsibilities for 
Dealing with the Cyber Field”). 
39 Id.  
40 Id. at 8–9. 
41 Id. at 4–5. Two subsidiary decisions follow. The fourth is a budgetary 
decision has that been made in section 4, stating: “The budget to implement this 
Resolution will be determined by the Prime Minister in consultation with the 
Minister of Finance, and will be submitted to the government for approval.” Id. 
at 2. The fifth decision upheld in section 5, excludes archetypical “special 
bodies” from the mandate of the Bureau. Section D in the Definition part defines 
these as follows: “Special Bodies”—the Israel Defense Forces, the Israeli Police, 
Israel Security Agency (“Shabak”), the Institute for Intelligence and Special 
Operations (“Mossad”) and the defense establishment by means of the Head of 
Security of the Defense Establishment (“DSDE”). Id.  
42 Id. at 4 (referring to Recommendation 14). 
43 Id. Recommendation 14 similarly calls for the “formulation of and the wise use 
of cyberspace.” Id. 
44 The Security & Defense Agenda (SDA), supra note 15, at 71. 
45 Id. at 83. 
46 Id. at 64. 
47 Id. at 80. 
48 Id. at 61. 
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and international exercises,49 as well as facilitate cooperation with 
parallel bodies abroad.50  
And second, the Resolution sets numerous recommendations 
regarding policy compliance. These recommendations essentially 
proffer a tailored edition of policy checkpoints. The INCB is set to 
determine a yearly “national threat of reference,”51 publish 
comparable ongoing “warnings,”52 and identify “preventive 
practices.”53  
A national Computer Emergency Response Team (“CERT”) 
was put in charge of the INCB’s early warning apparatus.54 The 
team conducts ongoing national assessments among various 
essential civil, security, and defense organizations while 
constituting a firsthand national defensive layer for the entire 
country’s administration.55 The national cyber situation room 
directly reports to INCB’s central command.56 One telling occasion 
sets a case in point concerning the CERT's contribution. During 
Operation Pillar of Defense, launched by Israel on November 14, 
2012 against the Hamas-governed Gaza Strip, a massive-scale 
overseas cyber attack was carried out against Israel.57 The attack 
targeted distributed denial of services (“DDoS”),58 the defacement 
of Israeli websites, and the publication of citizens’ data.59  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Resolution No. 3611, supra note 28, at 4 (referring to Recommendation 9). 
In particular, Recommendations 10 and 11 offers to assemble intelligence 
picture from all intelligence bodies and similarly reiterate a “national situation 
status” concerning cyber security, respectively. Id. 
50 Id. Substantive international cooperation is still deemed questionable by INCB, 
as discussed infra Part C.II. See Interview with Tal Goldstein, supra note 2.  
51 Resolution No. 3611, supra note 28, at 3 (referring to Recommendation 5). 
52 Id. at 4 (referring to Recommendation 13).  
53 Id.  
54 See Israeli National Cyber Bureau will Establish CERT, HAIM RAVIA ADV., 
(Dec. 12, 2013) http://www.law.co.il/en/news/israeli_internet_law_update/2013/ 
12/12/National-Cyber-Bureau-to-launch-Israeli-CERT/. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Daniel Cohen & Danielle Levin, Cyber Infiltration During Operation 
Protective Edge, FORBES (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/ 
2014/08/12/cyber-infiltration-during-operation-protective-edge/. 
58 Id. See also Chris Preimesberger, DDoS Attack Volume Escalates as New 
Methods Emerge, EWEEK (May 28, 2014) http://www.eweek.com/security/ 
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The INCB further advances coordination and cooperation 
between governmental bodies, the defense community, academia, 
industrial bodies, business, and other bodies relevant to the cyber 
field.60 INCB conveniently categorizes its projects into three 
general categories: the development of national cybersecurity 
infrastructure, the organization of human capital concerning that 
effort, and the maintenance of a cyber defense network, which 
includes the aforementioned cybersecurity room. INCB has thus 
far initiated three national security-related projects, all of which 
pertain to a multi-stakeholders’ apparatus. 
The first of three was an INCB project between 2012 and 2013 
in cooperation with the Israeli Ministry of Defense’s Research 
Authority and Development of Ammunition and Technological 
Infrastructure (“MAFAT”).61 Together, these organizations have 
allocated a sum of 10 million New Israeli Shekels (approximately 
$3.5 million (USD)) in a project labeled MASAD (per the initials 
of the term “Dual Cyber R&D” in Hebrew).62 This joint 
civil-military project thus approaches the cybersecurity challenge 
from a dual standpoint. It similarly has endowed 32 million New 
Israeli Shekels (approximately $10 million (USD)) for the years 
2012 through 2014 and is specifically aimed at fostering academic 
research in the field.63 
INCB initiated a second national cybersecurity infrastructure 
product in cooperation with Israel’s Office of the Chief of Scientist 
(“OCS”) in the Ministry of Economy. In a project called 
KIDMA the Chief Scientist adopted a preferential policy for 
INCB’s R&D projects. In compliance with INCB's commitment to 
the promotion of cybersecurity R&D, KIDMA is officially aimed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
slideshows/ddos-attack-volume-escalates-as-new-methods-emerge.html (defining 
DDoS as denial-of-service (DoS) or distributed denial-of service (DDoS) attack as 
an attempt to make a machine or network resource unavailable to its intended users). 
59 Cohen & Levin, supra note 57. 
60 Resolution No. 3611, supra note 28, at 4 (referring to Recommendation 16).  
61 Press Release, Israel Prime Minister’s Office, Israel National Cyber Bureau 
and Ministry of Defence Directorate for Research & Development Announce Plan to 
Advance Dual Civilian-Defense R&D Projects, available at http://www.pmo.gov.il/ 
English/MediaCenter/Spokesman/Pages/spokemasad311012.aspx. 
62 Id.  
63 Id. 
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at promoting entrepreneurship within this field while preserving 
and increasing Israel’s competitive edge in cybersecurity world 
markets.  64 The Chief Scientist implemented a program that 
endowed 80 million New Israeli Shekels (approximately $22 
million (USD)) for 2013–14.  65  
A third national cybersecurity infrastructure project focuses on 
developing cybersecurity research centers through a partnership 
with academia. To date, INCB has collaborated with two Israeli 
universities in the establishment of two university research 
centers.66 These are the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 
which focuses its research on technology and applicative sciences, 
and Tel-Aviv University, which has a broader interdisciplinary 
emphasis including political sciences and law.67 
The underlying dual proposition upheld by INCB continuously 
has been that not only is academic research lagging behind the 
industry, but also this lag is in fact cross-disciplinary, including 
non-technological fields and, particularly, social sciences and 
law.68 In response to this problem, in May 2014, the INCB and the 
Israeli Ministry of Science published a novel grant program as part 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 KIDMA in Hebrew is an acronym “the promotion of cybersecurity research 
and development (‘R&D’).” See generally Press Release, Israel Prime Minister’s 
Office, Israel National Cyber Bureau Head Announces Launch of KIDMA (Nov. 
13, 2013) [hereinafter Launch of KIDMA], available at http://www.pmo.gov.il/ 
English/MediaCenter/Spokesman/Pages/spokekidma131112.aspx (announcing the 
launch of Program KIDMA). See also Israel's Office of the Chief Scientist (OCS), 
NEWSLETTER 02-2012, (2012), http://www.moital.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/89646959-
5455-4A5A-99FD-C4B07D07E8E5/0/syber122012_3.pdf (stating that KIDMA 
includes upgraded funding for cybersecurity startups operating in technological 
incubators, a higher finance percentile in related venture capital funds, a 
fastened application examination process, etc.) 
65 See Launch of KIDMA, supra note 64. 
66 See, e.g., Major Cyber Security Center Launched at Tel Aviv University, 
TEL AVIV UNIV. (Sept. 16, 2014), http://english.tau.ac.il/blavatnik_cyber_center 
(describing a new cyber-security program at Tel Aviv University). Two 
additional university research centers are presently being discussed. See 
Interview with Tal Goldstein, supra note 2.  
67 Cf. Major Cyber Security Center Launched at Tel Aviv, supra note 66; see 
also, Interview with Tal Goldstein, supra note 2 
68 Id.  
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of a broad and interdisciplinary approach, which appeals to 
scientists, engineers, political scientists, and lawyers alike.  
The INCB has further developed a detailed program for 
promoting the development of human capital concerning cyber 
security. The INCB initiated advanced studies programs for 
cybersecurity in leading high schools with a strong technological 
curriculum and post-graduate academic programs. One such 
endeavor focuses on high schools within the socioeconomically 
disadvantaged country’s periphery.69 In another project labeled 
“Magshimim Leumit” (“Nationally Achieving” in Hebrew), the 
INCB and the Israel Ministry of Education established a three-year 
program, from 2013–16, focusing on educating and developing 
professional skills among outstanding high school students.70 The 
program was founded under the assumption that through human 
capital development, the field of cybersecurity can and will 
improve greatly.71 
The INCB regularly advises the Prime Minister, the 
government, and its committees regarding cyberspace.72 It also 
consolidates the administrative aspects of cyber regulation,73 and 
advances parliamentary legislation and secondary regulation in the 
cyber field.74 In 2012, INCB declared that the Bureau would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69  Opening of National Youth Cyberwarfare Program, ISRAEL PRIME MINISTER’S 
OFFICE, (Dec. 31, 2012), http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Events/ 
Pages/eventmagshimim311212.aspx.  
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Resolution No. 3611, supra note 28, at 3 (referring to Recommendation 1). 
Notwithstanding the Bureau's overarching mandate, in matters of foreign affairs 
and security, the advice provided to the government, to its committees and to the 
ministers, will be provided according to Recommendation 2 on behalf of the 
Bureau by means of the Israeli National Security Council. Id. Recommendation 
19 authorizes the Bureau “[t]o carry out any other role in the cyber field 
determined by the Prime Minister.” Id. at 4.  
73 Id. at 3. The Bureau will also offer supporting cross agency coordination 
thereof. Id. Recommendation 4 further adds that the Bureau will “inform all the 
relevant bodies, as needed, about the complementary cyberspace-related policy 
guidelines.” Id. 
74 Id. at 4. Recommendation 18 adds that the Bureau will serve as a regulating 
body in fields related to cyber security. Id 
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incorporate four types of activities and accompanying objectives:75 
the promotion of cybersecurity for organizations, the promotion of 
cybersecurity for the industrial and civil sectors, market regulation, 
and cybersecurity regulation through technological standard 
setting.76 From July to October 2012, INCB established 
recommendations for the government through a process that 
incorporated multi-stakeholder consultation.77 This process focused 
on, rather confined, cyber law needs.78  
Lastly and more importantly are three archetypical strategic 
propositions focused on establishing a measurable regulatory 
framework. The first strategic proposition solicits recommendations 
“to the Prime Minister and government regarding national cyber 
policy.”79 The second and third propositions are more general and 
thematic: to “promote research and development in cyberspace and 
supercomputing,”80 and to devise a “national concept”81 for coping 
with “emergency situations in cyberspace.”82 These three policies 
also underlay this Article’s positive framework.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 See INCB's Public Consultation with Multi-Stakeholders in Preparing 
Cyber Security Regulation, PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE, http://www.pmo.gov.il/ 
sitecollectiondocuments/pmo/cyber.doc (last visited Sept. 10, 2014). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. The process included four stages. Initially, INCB collected and 
processed expert testimonies. Soon after, a public advisory committee was 
established. Then a series of open consultations as well as particular 
consultations took place. Lastly, INCB generated a list of recommendations, 
which were at first open for public commentary, and then the INCB passed the 
final regulation recommendations to the Israeli government for consideration. 
Id.; see also Interview with Amit Ashkenazi, Israeli National Cyber Bureau 
(Sept. 18, 2014) (adding that it is clear that adapted legislation is needed yet the 
goal is not to opt for an overarching statute but rather a modular and 
proportional set of statutory frameworks for separate cyber threats). 
79 Resolution No. 3611, supra note 28, at 3 (“To guide the relevant bodies 
regarding the policies decided upon by the government and/or the Prime 
Minister; to implement the policy and follow-up on the implementation.”). 
80 Id. Such emblematic “research and development” should be promoted by 
undefined “professional bodies.” Id. 
81 Id.  
82 Id. There remains yet a fourth trade policy-related recommendation that, 
while seminal in the Israeli Cyber Bureau’s mandate, is nevertheless limited to 
advancement of the local economy. Recommendation 7 thus flatly calls upon the 
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III.  THE POSITIVE FRAMEWORK 
Several common cybersecurity themes have emerged in 
national cybersecurity policies worldwide. This section will 
discuss those themes. Cybersecurity definitions including the range 
of cyber threats, types of cybersecurity risks, and types of practices 
not designated as cybersecurity risks. In addition, models of 
cooperation over cybersecurity are reviewed including 
inter-governmental, PPP, and regional cooperation. Lastly, this 
Article considers specific fields of law for examination, including 
cybersecurity and international law, cyber attacks and international 
humanitarian law, cyber treaties and international treaty law, 
national responsibility for cyber attacks and state responsibility, 
Cybercrimes and cyber security, cyber attacks and international 
human rights law, and privacy and cyber security. 
A. Cybersecurity Definitions 
A cybersecurity policy model should include three categories 
of definitions that are repeatedly present in leading national cyber 
policies. First, a policy model should define the range of cyber 
threats: ranging from deliberate attacks for military or political 
advantage to the forms of Cybercrime, cyber warfare, and cyber 
terror against civil and military objects. Second, a policy model 
should define the types of cybersecurity risks: ranging from 
concealment (Trojan horse), infectious malware, malware for 
profit (vector, control, maintenance and payload), Botnets, 
cybercrime business models (advertising, theft, support), and 
chokepoints (anti-malware, registrars, payments, site takedown and 
blacklisting). Last, a policy model should define the types of 
practices not designated as cybersecurity risks: including joke 
software, hoaxes, scams, spam and Internet cookies. 
B. Models of Cooperation Over Cybersecurity 
A cybersecurity policy model ought to map cooperative 
international arrangements, involving governments and civil 
society to reduce risks to cyber security. To date, INCB receives 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Bureau to “work to encourage the cyber industry in Israel.” Id. This important, 
yet only loosely relevant, topic will remain outside the scope this Article. 
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only a limited degree of international cooperation.83 This is 
partially because few countries implement cybersecurity policies 
and even fewer countries have standing traditions of cyber 
industries funneled by policy-making mechanisms.84 Additionally, 
international consensus could be difficult to achieve given a 
preference for regional and bilateral alternatives.85 Notwithstanding 
these regulatory constraints, numerous cooperative avenues offer 
greater uniformity across countries. 
1. Inter-Governmental Cooperation  
In view of the national orientation of cybersecurity policies 
worldwide, inter-governmental cooperation could be expected to 
be a pivotal mode of cooperation. Alas, when countries opt for a 
cybersecurity policy, they generally maintain a national, or at most 
regional, framework for cooperation. The European Union and 
United States offer key illustrations. 
a. The European Union 
The European Union (“EU”) Cyber Security Strategy, “An Open, 
Safe and Secure Cyberspace,” and associated draft directives,86 set 
the framework in the EU for cyber security.87 The 2013 EU Cyber 
Security Strategy is gradually implemented by EU member states 
with the purpose of minimizing policy fragmentation among 
member states. 
The EU’s policy mirrors the 2009 EU Commission's issuance 
of a communication on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection 
(“CIIP”), entitled “Protecting Europe from large scale cyber attacks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 See Interview with Tal Goldstein, supra note 2. 
84 Id.  
85 Id. 
86 See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Concerning Measures to Ensure a High Common Level of Network and 
Information Security Across the Union, COM (2013) 48 final (Feb. 7, 2013), 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/202368. 
87 See Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: 
Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure 
Cyberspace, JOIN (2013) 1 final (Feb 7, 2013), available at http://eeas.europa.eu/ 
policies/eu-cyber-security/cybsec_comm_en.pdf. 
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and disruptions: enhancing preparedness, security, and resilience.”88 
Similar to the Israeli case, the EU Commission has recently noted 
that the upcoming challenges for Europe are broadly fourfold. 
First, EU member states have uneven and uncoordinated national 
approaches.89 Second, there is a need for a new European 
governance model for critical information infrastructures.90 Third, 
there is limited European early warning and incident response 
capability.91 Lastly, there is a prospective need for appropriate 
international cooperation.92 Collaboration with non-European 
national cybersecurity policies such as the Israeli policy could be 
productive. This is the European Commission's call to engage the 
global community to develop a set of principles reflecting 
European core values for the Internet’s resilience.93 
Moreover, a cybersecurity policy model could reflect on the 
cooperative extent of the European Programme for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection set forth in a Directive EU COM (2006) 
786.94 The program requires all EU member states, and members of 
the European Economic Area (“EEA”), to incorporate components 
of the Programme into their national statutes.95 Israel and the EU 
are continually discussing the EEA’s integration based on a direct 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 See EU Commission, Communication on Critical Information Infrastructure 
Protection, Protecting Europe from Large Scale Cyber-attacks and Disruptions: 
Enhancing Preparedness, Security and Resilience, COM (2009) 149 final (Mar. 
30, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/nis/docs/ 
comm_ciip/comm_en.pdf. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Communication from the Commission: On a European Programme for 
Critical Infrastructure Protection, COM (2006) 786 final (Dec. 12, 2006), 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006_ 
0786en01.pdf. See also David Satola & Henry L. Judy, Towards A Dynamic 
Approach to Enhancing International Cooperation and Collaboration in 
Cybersecurity Legal Frameworks: Reflections on the Proceedings of the 
Workshop on Cybersecurity Legal Issues at the 2010 United Nations, 37 Wm. 
Mitchell L. Rev. 1745, 1789 (2011). 
95 Id. 
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association agreement with Israel so the prospect of a harmonized 
edition of a cybersecurity policy brief may be particularly timely. 
Lastly, there remains the European Union Agency for Network 
and Information Security (“ENISA”) operating for the EU 
institutions and member states.96 ENISA serves as the EU’s 
coordinated response to cybersecurity issues of the EU and offers 
yet another platform for inter-governmental cooperation over 
cybersecurity in the EU.97  
b. The United States  
A cybersecurity policy model could further borrow from the 
example of the 2009 Comprehensive National Cybersecurity 
Initiative (“CNCI”) set forth by the United States government 
followed by the 2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace.98  
Most elements of the United States’ policy focus on the federal 
government’s cybersecurity capability rather than relying on state 
governments.99 In balance, however, similar to the Israeli case, the 
United States has still not firmly decided what the regulatory 
authority of the federal government should be in protecting critical 
infrastructure owned and operated by the private sector.100 
Nevertheless, the United States’ designated policy priorities 
include: (1) the economy, (2) protecting its networks, (3) law 
enforcement, (4) military, (5) Internet governance, (6) international 
development, and (7) Internet freedom.101 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 See European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), 
National Cyber Security Strategies: Practical Guide on Development and 
Execution, (December 2012), available at http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/ 
Resilience-and-CIIP/national-cyber-security-strategies-ncsss/national-cyber-security-
strategies-an-implementation-guide.  
97 Id. 
98 The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, THE WHITE HOUSE 
(May 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/cybersecurity/comprehensive-national-
cybersecurity-initiative; see also discussion infra Part IV. 
99 See The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, supra note 98. 
100 Id. 
101 See infra Part III.C.  
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2. Regional Cooperation  
A regional or inter-regional cybersecurity initiative 
incorporating future national examples could borrow from the 
model of Asia-Pacific’s regional cooperation over cybersecurity in 
National Computer Emergency Response Teams (“CERT”) by the 
Asia-Pacific CERT. This initiative already facilitates regional 
cooperation and coordination amongst CERTs and Computer 
Security Incident Response Teams (“CSIRTs”).102  
Another regional initiative that could provide an example of 
regional or inter-regional cooperation is the comparable 
Organization of American States’ (“OAS”) portal aimed at 
augmenting cybersecurity and regional responses to cybercrime.103 
This rather early-stage portal was created primarily to facilitate and 
streamline cooperation and information exchange among 
government experts from OAS member states.   
3. Public-Private Platform 
The business sector has taken on technology standardization 
initiatives since the early days of cyber security. Technology 
standardization has been advanced to increase the security of 
products, services, and networks. One such important initiative 
came from the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (“ICANN”).104 Its successful effort to promote 
development and adoption of security extensions for the domain 
name system (“DNSSEC”) illustrates how a private sector led 
initiative backed by government participation can significantly 
enhance the net’s security.105   
Another important example of governmental cooperation with 
commercial enterprises and educational institutions, albeit with a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), Ensuring A Safer 
Cyber Security Environment, Memo. No. 20 (May 2012), available at http://www. 
cscap.org/uploads/docs/Memorandums/CSCAP%20Memorandum%20No%2020% 
20--%20Ensuring%20a%20Safer%20Cyber%20Security%20Environmenet.pdf. 
103 See Inter-American Cooperation Portal on Cyber-Crime, ORG. OF AM. 
STATES, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/cyber.htm. 
104 For general information regarding ICANN, see https://www.icann.org/. 
105 See ENISA, Good Practices Guide for Deploying DNSSEC (Jan. 2010), 
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/res/technologies/tech/gpgdnssec. 
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technical orientation, are CERTs. They are intended to promote 
information sharing and better coordination among government 
agencies and the private sector against cyber attacks and identify 
and correct cyber-vulnerabilities.106 The lessons from CERTs are 
arguably still rather preliminary and necessitate further technical 
testing. 
4. Economics of Information Security Considerations 
The evaluation of incentives for multiple stakeholders to align 
their cybersecurity initiatives should further incorporate adherence 
to efficiency considerations.107 Thus, cybersecurity policy may 
offer not only direct regulation, but also indirect regulation aimed 
at incentivizing efficient behavior by end-users. These suggestions 
may range from optimal security enhancing incentives such as tax 
subsidies for compatible standards to incentivizing whistle blowing 
against hazardous Internet users or even against risky corporate 
espionage.   
5. Administrative Responses to Cyber Crises 
Administrative responses to cyber crises offer additional 
possibilities regarding the creation of a cybersecurity policy model. 
Such administrative responses include the Israeli Bureau’s call for 
defining emergency cyber situations in Recommendation 8 of the 
INCB’s recommendations, or the Bureau’s called for definition for 
cyber warnings in Recommendation 13 to the INCB's 
recommendations.108  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 See Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, FIRST, 
http://www.first.org (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). The European Government 
CERTs (EGC) Group has twelve member organizations. European Government 
CERTs (ECG) Group, ECG GROUP, http://www.egc-group.org (last visited Feb. 
20, 2015). 
107 Tyler Moore, Introducing the Economics of Cybersecurity: Principles and 
Policy Options, in PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON DETERRING 
CYBERATTACKS, supra note 33, at 3.  
108 See discussion infra Part III.C. 
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C. Cybersecurity and International Law 
Apart from the national character of most cybersecurity 
policies, there remains a myriad of international law issues that 
must be addressed by any policy model. 
1. Cyber Attacks and International Humanitarian Law  
This part introduces discussion over most key definitions 
within international humanitarian law. These include a 
reassessment of the use of non-physical and non-military force, the 
definition of a cyber-armed conflict alongside its intensity 
dialectics, and the classification of cyber and unlawful combatants. 
It further includes cyber terror and its consistency with asymmetric 
war argumentation, collective security, and self-defense in the 
midst of immediate and even anonymous cyber attacks, and even 
the definition of the all-out aggressive cyber war.109 These issues 
arise in a variety of forums and should be incorporated, at least in 
part, into a cybersecurity policy model. For example, in 2010 
NATO issued a report of expert findings—NATO 2020: Analysis 
and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic 
Concept for NATO—which included preliminary recommendations 
offering prospective changes in the NATO Strategic Concept to 
specify the characteristics of a cyber-attack that would trigger the 
obligation of collective response under Section 5 of the NATO 
treaty.110 Equally important is the application of Article 51 of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations in International Law: The Use of 
Force, Collective Security, Self-Defence, and Armed Conflicts, in PROCEEDINGS 
OF A WORKSHOP ON DETERRING CYBERATTACKS, supra note 33, at 151. See also 
Jon P. Jurich, Cyberwar and Customary International Law: The Potential of a 
“Bottom-up” Approach to an International Law of Information Operations, 9 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 275, 275–295 (2008). 
110 See Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New 
Strategic Concept for NATO, NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic 
Engagement (May 17, 2010), http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/expertsreport.pdf. 
In addition, in 2013 a second document concerning one aspect of cyber attacks 
was published, namely the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable 
to Cyber Warfare. See INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS, TALLINN MANUAL 
ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. 
Schmitt, ed., Cambridge University Press 2013). The manual was written for 
NATO, although it does not necessarily represent NATO's views. The manual 
aims at defining cyber warfare under the international law and set rules to 
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UN Charter on individual or collective self-defense if a cyber 
armed attack occurred against a UN member remains unresolved. 
2. Cyber Treaties and International Treaty Law 
Cybersecurity and the challenge of international agreement 
within international treaty law and the 1969 Vienna Convention’s 
definition warrants further consideration, especially considering 
that no single cybersecurity binding agreement within international 
treaty law thus far entered into force.111 
3. National Responsibility for Cyber Attacks and State 
Responsibility  
Within public international law, the State Responsibility 
doctrine—a doctrine governing when and how a state is held 
responsible for a breach of an international obligation—offers 
additional challenges. Topics such as state responsibility 
attribution, online national sovereignty, and effective governance 
of information commons are all central to countering cyber attacks 
while bestowing national responsibility thereof.112 One should 
recall the breakthrough 2013 agreement by the UN that acknowledges 
the applicability of international law and state responsibility in 
cyberspace.113 
4. Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity 
Cybercrimes and cybersecurity should be conveniently 
addressed within the scope of the 2001 Convention on Cybercrime 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
govern such conflicts including rules about the responsibility of the state or 
international humanitarian law. Id. 
111 See Abraham Sofaer et al., Cyber Security and International Agreements, 
in PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON DETERRING CYBERATTACKS, supra note 
33.  
112 See generally Lech J. Janczewski & Andrew M. Colarik, CYBER WARFARE 
AND CYBER TERRORISM (Lech J. Janczewski & Andrew M. Colarik eds., 2008). 
113 See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the U.N. Group of Governmental 
Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications 
in the Context of International Security, U.N. Doc. A/68/98* (July 30, 2013). 
Surely, laws of state responsibility incorporate the principles governing the means 
by which a state is held responsible for a breach of an international obligation by 
one of its subjects. See Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., U.N. 
Doc A/56/10, GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp No 10, p 43 (2001). 
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(the “Budapest Convention”) initially adopted by the Council of 
Europe (“COE”).114 The treaty addresses three issues that relate to 
cyber security. The first is cybercrime that nations should attend to 
in their criminal codes.115 The second is the authorities 
governments should take on with the purpose of accessing 
communications or stored records for evidentiary needs.116 The 
third issue in cybersecurity policy models is transnational 
cooperation mechanisms within the context of the Convention on 
Cybercrime.117  
5. Cyber Attacks and International Human Rights Law 
  There is a paucity of literature from the lens of human rights 
over national and international cybersecurity.118 The legal 
framework herein should remain distinct from national 
constitutional legal analyses given that international human rights 
law surely constitutes a separate public international legal 
analysis.119  
6. Privacy and Cybersecurity 
Privacy and security are occasionally conflated.120 Academics 
and advocates oftentimes treat the two as exchangeable.121 Security 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CONVENTION ON CYBERCRIME (2001), http:// 
conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm. This convention is also 
known as the “Budapest Convention.” 
115 Id. 
116 Id.  
117 Id. At the pentennial United Nations Crime Congress held in April 2010 in 
Salvador, Brazil, negotiations of a global cybercrime treaty failed. Disagreements 
emerged over national sovereignty issues and concerns for human rights. See 
generally The History of Global Harmonization on Cybercrime Legislation—The 
Road to Geneva, available at http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/documents/cybercrime_ 
history.pdf (providing a history of cyber crime harmonization); see also infra 
Part IV for comparison of cybercrime policies. 
118 See J. B. Wolf, War Games Meets the Internet: Chasing 21st Century 
Cybercriminals With Old Laws and Little Money, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 95 
(2000). 
119 See infra Part IV (discussing policies concerning civil liberties). 
120 See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Privacy Versus Security, Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 667, 667 
(2013) (illustrating meta argument beginning with the seminal work of Jon 
Mills). 
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and privacy should, however, be treated separately, at least in part. 
Privacy entails normative decisions about competing claims to 
legitimate access to, use of, and alteration of information.122 
Security on the other hand implements those choices while 
mediating between information and privacy selections.123 
Cybersecurity may thus require ongoing, preventive, and 
widespread surveillance along with significant collaboration with 
online intermediaries. As in the Israeli case, other countries have 
adopted data protection laws that follow the EU model,124 the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”) model,125 or the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(“APEC”) model.126 Under these laws, the data controller, typically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Id. at 669.  
122 Id. at 667. 
123 Id. 
124 See EUR. PARL. DOC. (EP-PE_TC1-COD(2010)0273)(2013). The European 
Parliament recently presented the European Parliament legislative resolution of 
4 July 2013 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of the European Union on attacks against information systems and 
repealing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA. In this proposal, the 
European Parliament offers solutions to cyber attacks on information systems. It 
has done so without clear adherence to the conceptual relations between privacy 
and cybersecurity concepts. 
125 See OECD, CYBERSECURITY POLICY MAKING AT A TURNING POINT: 
ANALYSING A NEW GENERATION OF NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY STRATEGIES 
FOR THE INTERNET ECONOMY (2012). See generally OECD GUIDELINES FOR THE 
SECURITY OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND NETWORKS: TOWARDS A CULTURE OF 
SECURITY (2002), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/22/15582260.pdf. 
126 See APEC, THE FIFTH APEC MINISTERIAL MEETING ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
AND INFORMATION INDUSTRY (TELMIN5), STATEMENT ON THE SECURITY OF 
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURES (2002). The Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”) Telecommunications and Information 
Working Group (“APEC-TEL”) provides a forum for governments, businesses, 
and private sectors of the twenty-one APEC member states. At TELMIN 5 in 
Shanghai, China, on May 29–30, 2002, the Ministers called for domestic 
implementation of the ten measures included in the United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 55/63, titled Combating the Criminal Misuse of 
Information Technologies, of 4 Dec. 2000. The TELMIN 5 further called on 
APEC-TEL to give particular precedence to, facilitate within, and work on the 
protection of information and communication infrastructures. Lastly, 
APEC-TEL holds projects in progress aimed at raising awareness regarding 
cybersecurity and cybercrime. That is, including the development of an APEC 
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the entity that has the primary relationship with an individual, 
remains responsible for the collection and processing of personal 
data, even when third parties process the data. The data controller 
is required to ensure that any third party processing personal data 
on his or her behalf takes adequate technical and organizational 
security measures to safeguard the data.  
The latest revelations regarding the NSA’s surveillance 
program designed to counter cyber-terror threats initiated a public 
debate regarding the limits of governmental powers in the United 
States.127 These led to several congressional and parliamentary 
hearings and will soon possibly encounter judicial review. 
Moreover, pressure by the intelligence community led to the 
proposal of an archetypical cybersecurity U.S. legislation, named 
as the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (“CISPA”).128 
This proposed law alters the balance between security and civil 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
cybersecurity Strategy. See also Recommendation by the APEC 
Telecommunications and Information Working Group (“TEL”) to APEC Senior 
Officials (“SOM”) for an APEC Cybersecurity Strategy (2001). 
127 See Niraj Chokshi, NSA Spying Appears to Stem From 550-Word Section of 
PATRIOT Act, NATIONAL JOURNAL (June 7, 2013), http://www.nationaljournal.com/ 
nationalsecurity/nsa-spying-appears-to-stem-from-550-word-section-of-patriot-
act-20130607. Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 
2001, 107 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, § 215 (allowing the FBI in the 
aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attacks to apply the Secret Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (“FISA”) court for an order to gather information “for an 
investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 
activities”).  
128 See Carol. M. Hayes and J. P Kesan, At War Over CISPA: Towards a 
Reasonable Balance between Privacy and Security, ILL. PUB. L. RESEARCH 
PAPER NO. 13-03 at 1 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2135618 
(arguing the proposed legislation can be useful to achieve the proper balance 
between security and privacy if it is to be amended appropriately). An additional 
law that should constitutes cyber security-related surveillance considerations is 
the 1994 the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). 
This act overall guarantees that intelligence agencies can monitor all telephone, 
broadband Internet, and VoIP traffic in real-time through back doors created for 
them by telecommunications carriers and manufacturers of telecommunications. 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement, Pub. Law 103-414, 108 Stat. 
4279 (1994).  
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liberties, while allowing sharing of Internet traffic information 
between the government and private companies.129   
IV.  A CROSS-SECTION COMPARISON 
To date, over thirty countries have declared an archetypical 
national cybersecurity strategy.130 Countries have conducted a very 
similar active debate on codes of conduct for cyberspace, 
application of international laws, Internet governance, and other 
aspects of functions, roles, and circumstances of cyberspace. 
National policies thus deal with the risks surrounding cyberspace 
from such viewpoints as national security and economic growth. 
Such national state practice has ultimately turned the functions, 
roles, and circumstances of cyberspace into a common 
international issue. Designing a cybersecurity policy model should 
therefore be especially attuned to leading national cybersecurity 
policies. This Part offers a cross-section comparison between five 
such countries, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, 
Japan, and the Netherlands.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Id. 
130 See e.g., EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR NETWORK AND INFORMATION 
SECURITY (ENISA), National Cyber Security Strategies in the World, http://www. 
enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/national-cyber-security-strategies-ncsss/ 
national-cyber-security-strategies-in-the-world (last visited July 14, 2014). 
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V.  CONCLUSION (AND BEST PRACTICES) 
Israel’s inauguration of the INCB cyber command and its 
upward national cyber policy has five facets. These are: 
(1) implementing a medium-run five-year plan to scale up the 
country as a world industry leader in cyber security; (2) investing 
in R&D based on interdisciplinary university research centers 
backed by extensive government funding; (3) encouraging industry 
to develop new technologies; (4) setting up a supercomputer 
center; and (5) boosting academic studies in cybernetics.131  
The effectiveness of Israel’s cyber policy is nevertheless still 
unfolding as many caveats apply. First, cybersecurity is still an 
evolving cross discipline, whereas future cyber risks and threats 
are remarkably untried. Any cybersecurity policy model should 
thus reflect this platitude and adhere to regulatory modularity 
funneled by administrative flexibility. Furthermore, national 
cybersecurity policies are often of a reactive nature, typically 
emerging only after equivalent cyber threats evolve. Israel’s 
experience is no different. As a result, taken from the 
organizational angle, cybersecurity policies, in due course, hardly 
replace running administrative organs as they wind up 
conscientiously coordinating them. The INCB serves yet again as a 
proof positive. INCB’s rather modest thirty-employee core hardly 
has the means to battle cyber threats directly.132 That is, as INCB 
solely coordinates cyber policies by a myriad of local defense and 
civil agencies and corporations.  
Another caveat applies, calling for certain restraint towards the 
Israeli example. Accordingly, as opposed to most cyber-literate 
countries worldwide, the INCB materialized in reaction to 
momentous national security threats unfamiliar, or at least 
moderately undemanding, in comparison to most of its 
counterparts. The fact that the cyber attacks that Israel faced were 
national security threats as opposed to less dangerous cybercrimes 
which many other nations face, led to a different kind of regulatory 
regime. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 See discussion supra Part II. 
132 See Interview with Tal Goldstein, supra note 2. 
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That said, in opting for a cybersecurity policy model for 
countries at large, this Policy Brief reviews the main legal themes 
to be considered and does so in particular reference to the national 
cybersecurity policies of the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, and of course Israel. The practices 
by these countries and declared policies suggest the following list 
of conclusive best practices. 
A. Promote Cybersecurity R&D 
Following the experiences of the United States, Israel, and the 
United Kingdom, national commitment to research and 
development in cybersecurity is essential for two main reasons. 
Firstly, it cultivates dynamic international research communities 
able to take on next-generation challenges to cyber security. 
Secondly, this commitment enables national cybersecurity 
industries to expand and access overseas markets. Clearly, such 
practice should be adapted to the scientific educational frameworks 
and underlying national preferences. 
B. Promote Cybersecurity Education 
There are three significant types of educational policies within 
the cybersecurity context. To begin with, educational programs 
help nations gain the resources and skills to build core capacities in 
technology and cybersecurity. The promotion of cybersecurity 
education is meant to raise awareness among businesses of the 
threat and protective actions they may take. In recent years, the 
United States most noticeably helped make cybersecurity 
education a priority at multilateral forums such as the OAS, APEC, 
and the UN. Cyber security-related education and training is also 
promoted to help target cybercrime. In this context, cybersecurity 
education and training programs are aimed at law enforcement 
officials, forensic specialists, jurists, and legislators. The last 
educational policy is to improve educational involvement at higher 
education and postgraduate levels in order to construct a vibrant 
research community and related cybersecurity industries. 
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C. Ensuring Ongoing Risk Assessment 
All national cybersecurity policies reviewed have developed a 
detailed watch, warning, and incident response to cyber threats 
through exchanging information with trusted networks. Similarly, 
nations systematically test their policies in national and 
international cybersecurity exercises to elevate and strengthen 
established security procedures. Lastly, national policies have 
established similar schemes for certifying the competence of 
information assurance and cyber security.  
D. Promote Counter Cybercrime Policy 
Cybercrime policy has developed both multilaterally like with 
the Budapest convention and bilaterally occasionally between 
nations. Given cybercrime’s international character, it is likewise 
the policy of the United States to encourage other countries to 
become parties to the Budapest convention and help current 
non-parties use the Convention as a basis for their own laws.133 
Within the European context, cybercrime policy further builds 
upon the new EU Directive on attacks on information systems. 
Equally, all reviewed countries have committed to increase the 
capabilities of their law enforcement agencies to combat 
cybercrime. On balance however, a cybersecurity policy model 
should carefully scale institutional preferences related to online 
law enforcement at large. Canada, to name but one example, has 
delegated to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police domestic and 
international enforcement responsibilities.134 Yet the Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service, similarly, is mandated to analyze and 
investigate domestic and international threats to the security of 
Canada.135 
E. Promote Cybersecurity in International Law 
All countries reviewed share a unified commitment to the rule 
of law in cyberspace and to international law. Noticeably, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 THE WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE, supra 
note 9, at 20. 
134 See Canada’s Cyber Security Strategy, supra note 11, at 10. 
135 Id. 
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United Kingdom has explicitly adopted an additional international 
norm-based policy of tolerance and respect for diversity of 
language, culture, and ideas.136 The Netherlands added on its behalf 
a commitment to peace which cybersecurity should uphold.137 
Among the individual rights mentioned, across the countries 
reviewed, are those of privacy, freedom of speech, and intellectual 
property.138 National policies reviewed have not mentioned 
international humanitarian law or state responsibility policy 
preferences. For the application of international laws to 
cyberspace, it is important that existing international laws be 
adapted to cyberspace, although binding treaties and customary 
public international law (and even mere state practice) are still 
noticeably missing. 
F. Forms of Regulation & Institutional Aspects 
The United States, unlike the other reviewed countries, has 
gone into much detail in elaborating the role of technological 
standards in regulating cyber security. It has consequently called 
for industry-government cooperation over an open, voluntary, and 
compatible standardization of the net's security.139 The U.S. 
government further reiterates its understanding that such standard 
setting activity is not only commercially beneficial to the U.S. 
economy, but also industry-led by design.140 There is thus a 
conceptual gap between the United States and Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and the Netherlands over this issue. The latter countries 
implicitly undermine the role of standards in regulating the 
Internet’s security as they opt for either self-regulation such as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 See UK CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY, infra note ii at 22.  
137 See NCSS (2011), supra note 14, at 9. 
138 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE, supra note 9, at 
21; UK CABINET OFFICE, THE UK CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY, PROTECTING 
AND PROMOTING THE UK IN A DIGITAL WORLD 22 (Nov. 2011), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6
0961/uk-cyber-security-strategy-final.pdf; Government of Canada, supra note 
11, at 8; JAPANESE INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY COUNCIL, INFORMATION 
SECURITY STRATEGY FOR PROTECTING THE NATION 49 (2013), available at 
http://www.nisc.go.jp/active/kihon/pdf/cybersecuritystrategy-en.pdf.  
139 See International Strategy for Cyberspace, supra note 9, at 18.  
140 Id. at 23.  
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Netherlands or state regulation backed by judicial review as 
implied by the United Kingdom and Canada.  
G. Balancing Cybersecurity with Civil Liberties 
National cybersecurity policies equally share a commitment to 
enhance access to a secure, private, reliable, and safe Internet. The 
United States further offers to protect Internet service providers 
(“ISPs”) and other providers of connectivity, while explaining that 
ISPs too often fall victim to legal regimes of intermediary liability 
that pass the role of censoring legitimate speech to such 
companies. Balancing cybersecurity with civil liberties is further 
promoted by international and regional partnerships with countries 
that share comparable fundamental values. Such values were 
commonly associated with freedom of speech and association, 
privacy, respect for basic human rights, and the rule of law at 
large.  
H. Type of Cooperation 
Cybersecurity policies seem to be deeply intertwined with 
cooperation between countries internationally or regionally. 
Leading regional cooperative frameworks are NATO’s cyber 
defense policy, ASEAN Regional Forum (“ARF”), Asia-Pacific 
forum, and the Council of Europe and the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe. Governments similarly 
collaborate with the private sector in PPP initiatives in order to 
protect federal, state, and local government as cyber threats are 
said to be business-driven in part. The Netherlands’ cybersecurity 
policy further calls upon enhancing civil-military cooperation.141 
On the international level of cooperation, national 
cybersecurity policies reveal cyber allies to be strongly associated 
with countries that share similar socio-political values and 
interests. The countries reviewed were Western democratic 
countries or otherwise close security and intelligence partners. 
Leading examples were Canada’s closest intelligence partners 
namely the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, and 
Japan's strategic alliance with the United States. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 See NCSS 2 (2013), supra note 14, at 9. 
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